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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent,: 
vs. 
WILLIAM LUIS FORSYTH, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
supreme Court No. 16,636 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This was a criminal prosecution on five counts of theft by 
deception, second degree felonies in violation of Title 76, Chap-
ter 6, Section 405, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried by a jury on June 25, 26 and 27, 1979, 
before the Honorable George E. Ballif, Judge of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, in and for the State of Utah, Provo, Utah County, 
Utah. Count V of the information was dismissed during the trial 
and a verdict of guilty was returned by the jury on the remaining 
four counts on June 27, 1979, from which verdict the defendant 
appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appellant prays that this Court dismiss the informa-
tion or grant the defendant a new trial. 
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2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I 
I 
I 
Defende_nt was the organizer and officer of a Utah corporatior .. ( 
Investors entered into an agreement with the co~poration to invest! 
funds. In exchange, the investor received a written contract fro:r 
the corporation to have certain items performed including the 
repayment of the investment within a certain time. The four in- (, 
vestors set forth in the information invested $5, 000 each. The 
written contract stated that the funds were to be repaid out of 
future membership sales, which were to commence after certain 
physical facilities were built. There was approximately $300,00~ ( 
of f~nds available to the corporation before and after the invest~1 
invested such $20,000. 
The physical facilities were commenced but never finished 
and the corporation became insolvent and did not pay such debts. 
There were other promises, opinions, and representations made in 
conjunction with the execution of the written contracts. Because 
the venture failed, many of these oral promises, etc., were not 
performed. 
During the trial, the trial Judge allowed other investors 
not listed in the information and in fact some investors that 
r 
invested in other corporations to testify that they did not 
receive their money back. One investor was a widow who invested , 
her life savings. However, she never talked with the defendant or 
one of his agents before such investment. There were a total of 
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3 
ten other investors that were allowed to testify that they did 
not receive ·their money back, in addition to the four investors 
set forth in the information.· 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE 
OF THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE WHICH TENDED TO 
SHOW THAT HE HAD COMMITTED OTHER CRIMES OR 
CIVIL WRONGS. 
This case involves the single issue of whether the defendant 
was denied the right to a fair trial by the admission into evidence 
of the testimony of investors other than the alleged victims in a 
case of theft by deception, where the testimony of those witnesses 
as to alleged civil wrongs did not come within the exceptions of 
Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and was highly pre-
judicial to the defendant. 
At the trial, the Court admitted over objection, the testimony 
of nine witnesses who were investors, but who were not among the 
four witnesses listed in the information as "alleged victims". 
The Court admitted the testimony to show the over-all pattern or 
scheme or design of the defendant. (T. 252, L. 2-9), Rule 55, 
Utah Rules of Evidence, prohibits generally the admission of evidence 
of other crimes or civil wrongs, except when relevant to prove some 
other material fact such as, inter alia, the plan of the defendant. 
The admission of such evidence was contrary to the principle 
set forth by this Court; namely, that the issue in a criminal trial 
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should be whether the defendant is guilty of the specific~( 
charged in the information. Other evidence of crimes, criminal I 
conduct, or wrongdoing should not be admitted for the purpose of I' 
disgracing the defendant ~ ~ showing defendant's propensity!.£ i 
commit~ crime. State of Utah v. Vira Mason, 530 P.2d 795, ! 
1 Whartont Criminal Evidence, SECS. 233, et seq. (Twelfth Ed. I 
I 
1955); State v. Dickson, 12 U.2d 8, 264 P.2d 412. (emphasis I 
added). \ 
The general rule is that in a criminal case, evidence which r 
shows or tends to show that the defendant had committed other I 
crimes in addition to that for which he is on trial is inadrnissatt1 
Olson v. Swap£, 535 P.2d 1232 (1975). (emphasis added). 
In State of Utah v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, the Court stated 
as follows: "This Court has stated on numerous occasions that 
evidence of other crimes allegedly committed by the defendant is 
not admissable if the purpose is to disgrace the defendant as a 
person of evil character with a propensity to commit crime and th 
likely to have committed the crime charged." 
The Court has also stated that there must be " ... some legi-
timate purpose to be served by the evidence which is otherwise 
competent and relevant." State v. Mason, 530 P.2d 795. 
In the present case, the State represented to the Court tha 
the evidence of other investors should be admitted for the expre 
purpose of showing a common plan or scheme. 
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This Court has set a specific standard for receiving such 
evidence. Such evidence is admissable only if it will "show 
a conunon scheme or plan embracing commission of similar crimes 
• ., 
so related to each other that the proof of one tends to establish 
the crime for which the defendant is on trial." Olson v. Swapp, 
Supra. (emphasis added). 
In the present case, the evidence from the other investors 
did not meet the standard for the exception set forth by Rule 55 
as defined by this Court. On the contrary, such evidence tended 
to show the defendant had the propensity to commit other civil 
wrongs or crimes and was grossly prejudicial. Such evidence, as 
a matter of law, did not show a common scheme or plan. 
Other than the "alleged victims" in this business endeavor, 
the State called nine other investors to testify. Their testimony 
did not show a common plan or scheme, but did grossly prejudice 
the defendant's right to a fair trial by parading witness after 
witness before the jury who complained, not of any misrepresenta-
tions by the defendant, but that they didn't get their money back 
from their investment. 
Perhaps the most damaging example of this was the testimony 
of Helen Evans. Mrs. Evans testified that she invested in June, 
1973. However, she didn't even meet the defendant until January, 
1974. (T. 259, L. 12-17). The defendant made no representations 
to her prior to her investment (T. 257, L. 19-28), but Mrs. Evans 
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relied on the representations of a relative. (T. 256). The 
sum and substance of her testimony, though, was that she was a 
widow (T. 260, L. 17-18) who invested her $12,500 and didn't 
get a dime back. (T. 263, L. 17-21). This testimony of a civil 
wrong allegedly done by defendant was highly inflammatory and 
I 
I 
Three other witnesses also were allowed to testify I 
prejudicial to the defendant. 
that they I 
put their money in but didn't get it back, even though they, too, I 
nad not even spoken to the defendant about the investment prior tol 
making it. One of these was Ralph Ladle, the "alleged victim" of 
Count V of the information, which count was dismissed (T. 396) 
after Ladle testified that he had no conversations with defendant I 
prior to investing. (T. 269, L. 24-29). Yet, he was still allow~ 
to testify that he didn't get his money back (T. 275, 276). 
Armstrong also testified the defendant made no representations 
prior to his investment (T. 293, L. 10-17), as did Hewitt 
(T. 296, L. 4-18, 25-30). 
Other witnesses included Brown, who gave no evidence of fraua 
or a common scheme or plan, but testified he did not gEt t.is money 
back (T. 287, L. 23-25); Park, who also gave no evidence of a comll 
scheme, but did not get his money back (T. 306, L. 2-4); Thorell, 
again no evidence of the common scheme, but didn't get his money 
back (T. 311, L. 30; 312, L. 1); Taylor, with no evidence of a 
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common scheme, but who didn't get his money back (T. 319, L. 20-21); 
Terry, with,no evidence of a common scheme or plan, but who also 
got no money back (T. 327, L. 11-12); and Brothers, with no 
evidence of a common plan or scheme and who got no money back 
(T. 347, L. 29-30). 
The sheer weight of the numbers of witnesses put on by the 
State for the purpose of showing that many people didn't get their 
money back from this investment, even though not showing the common 
scheme or plan by the defendant to commit the crimes with which he 
was charged, shifted the burden to the defendant, inflamed the 
jury, and denied the defendant the right to a fair trial on the 
information before the jury. 
This evidence showed the defendant's propensity to commit the 
crimes charged, rather than that he committed the specific acts 
alleged in the information. The evidence was introduced, received 
and viewed by the jury for purposes other than the exception to 
the general rule as set forth by the trial Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial Court committed reversable error in overruling 
defendant's objections to the introduction of evidence of other 
crimes or civil wrongs contrary to Rule 55. Having allowed the 
evidence before the jury, the trial Court should have considered 
the prejudicial effect of such evidence on the defendant's ability 
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8 
to obtain a fair trial and should not have denied defendant's 
motions to dismiss and for a directed verdict. 
Respectfully submitted this ~ day of August, 1980. 
QJ~st maJ~ 
1
1 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
I 
I 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that two true and exact copies of the 
fore.going Brief of Defendant-Appellant were mailed to Robert 
I 
I 
I Wallace, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney for Plaintiff-
Respondent, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, postag1I 
prepaid, this £'..._day of Augu~f(, ~ I 
I 
I 
I 
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